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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DARREN J. POLLICK, by and 
through his Guardian ad Litem, John R. 
Pollick, and JOHN R. POLLICK, 
Plai,ntiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
J.C. PENNEY COMPANY, 
a corporation, Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11880 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in 
the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a negligence action to recover damages for 
personal injuries suffered by Darren J. Pollick, a 
1 
minor, as a result of falling over a banister in defend-
ant's store, located at 4849 South State Street, Murray, 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which returned a 
verdict in favor of the minor for damages in the sum of 
$2,500.00 and awarded the sum of $821.36 to the father 
for medical expenses. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the jury verdict and 
granting either a judgment as a matter of law or a new 
trial. Plaintiff contends the verdict rendered by the jury 
should be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in the defend-
ant's brief is generally accurate. However, the plaintiffs 
feel that the following amplification would be helpful 
in order for this Court to determine the issues presented 
in this case. It is, of course, the position of the plaintiffs 
herein that in determining the arguments set forth by 
the defendant that the facts must be construed most 
favorable to the plaintiffs for the reason that there is 
a jury verdict in this case. This is particularly true in 
regard to Point I of Defendant's Brief. The facts are 
these: 
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The plaintiff, John R. Pollick, accompanied by his 
three old son on .May 5, 1964, went to defendant's 
5tore at 1'849 South State Street, Murray, Utah, to 
purchase a Mother's Day gift ( R. 122-123). The 
plaintiff went to the Ladies' Department, which is lo-
cated on the main floor of the store. Directly opposite 
the department and in the center of the main fioor is 
a stairwell which leads to the basement. Surrounding 
three sides of the stairwell is a wooden banister. The 
banister is approximateyl 36 inches high and attached 
to the base and extending around the banister is a 
mopboard 71/2 inches high and % of an inch wide. The 
child, Darren Pollick, testified that he climbed the 
banister in question, that is, the mopboard allowed him 
to stand on the same and he so remembered this before 
his injury. 
Mr. Pollick selected a dress and while standing 
at the cash register to complete the sale, he heard a 
scream and went to the stairway where he saw his boy 
in the arms of the manager of the store. The manager 
advised plaintiff his boy had fallen over the banister 
and landed on a display rack approximately eleven 
feet below in the basement. The boy suffered a broken 
leg as a result of the accident. 
Plaintiffs filed this case to recover damages for the 
injuries sustained by the minor child and for medical 
expenses. Plaintiffs proceeded upon the theory they 
were business invitees and defendant neglected to exer-
cise due care to make the premlses reasonably safe for 
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them by maintaining the aforementioned banister in a 
dangerous and unsafe condition. 
It should be pointed out at this juncture that the 
plaintiff's theory was simply that the defendant, in al-
lowing a climbable mopboard to be attached to the 
wooden banister, was negligent under the circum-
stances in that the store knew and, in fact, encouraged 
children of tender years to be present on its premises. 
The defendant throughout its brief seems to indicate 
that it was the position of the plaintiff that there was 
some negligence in the construction of the banister but 
the defendant in st;tting the plaintiff's position has cre-
ated a strawman. The fact of the matter is that the plain-
tiff's theory proceeded on the fact that the defendant, 
under the circumstances, maintained a dangerous and 
unsafe condition for children of tender years. 
Darren clearly testified that immediately prior to 
the fall he was standing on top of the mopboard and 
then he fell (R. no). 
The manager of the store, Mr. Dennis Barlocker, 
testified as follows: 
(R. 161, 162) 
"Q. Now, it's a matter of fact isn't it, Mr. 
Barlocker, that J. C. Penney's as a department 
store, prides itself in family, or having families 
come and shop there, isn't that right? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And while you were there for three and 
4 
a half years, you saw a lot of little children in 
that place, haven't you? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And in fact it's a common practice for 
people to come with small children, isn't that 
right? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And, of course, you've known that all 
along and while you were there at the Murray 
office that's-you've known that, haven't you? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And it's not uncommon for small children 
to be in and about the store? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Now, I guess, also, one of your particular 
duties, isn't it Mr. Barlocker, is to make sure that 
this place is safe for the patrons when they come 
in there, isn't that right? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And, now you were familiar were you not 
with this particular banister that borders this 
said well? 
"A. Very familiar with it. 
"Q. And this particular bannister, I guess, it 
also had a little bit of a beauty sign to it, is that 
right? 
"MR. NEBEKER: Little what? 
"MR. DIBBLEE: Was it there for beauty? 
Was it there for beauty? 
"A. No, not necessarily. 
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"Q. So, therefore, then it was just for the pur-
pose of having this handrail that the people use, 
is that correct ? 
"A. Well, it was built to keep people from 
falling in. 
"Q. Falling down the stairs 1 The stairs this 
way, is that correct? 
"A. Yes, definitely. 
* * * * 
"Q. Now with respect to this particular ban-
nister, Mr. Bariocker, it would have been prac-
tical and would have been possible would it not, 
sir, to put a little extension along the top of this 
railing here to raise it a little higher, to make 
it higher, you could do that couldn't you'? 
"A. I'm sure it could be done. I am no con-
tractor but I'm sure it could be done. 
"Q. Well, as a practical matter it could have 
been done, couldn t it, just put some sort of ex-
tension on, like this, so that it would make this 
higher and rather than being thirty-six inches 
from the floor, could have been higher, couldn't 
it? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And as a matter of fact this particular 
mop board, here, for all practical purposes could 
have been removed, could it not, sir? 
"A. Defintely. 
"Q. And, then, if that particular mop board 
had been removed, then small children that were 
in the area would not be able to climb up on this 
bannister, would they, sir? 
* * * * 
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"A. Would you restate your question? 
"Q. (By Mr. Dibblee) I say, if the mop board 
would have been removed, then, little children 
that had been walking around wouldn't be able 
to put their foot up on there, would they? 
"A. No, they wouldn't be able to put their 
foot up there. 
"Q. And isn't it also true, Mr. Barlocker, that 
if J. C. Penney Company had put an extension 
up on this particular area on the top of this rail-
ing and extended it higher it could have been 
done with all practicality, it could prevent people 
from falling over the bannister, wouldn't it? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And in fact it would have prevented ex-
actly the accident that happened in this case, 
wouldn't it? 
"A. Yes, sir." 
Based on this evidence the trial court presented the 
case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor 




THE EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT A 
FINDING THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLI-
GENT. 
Throughout defendant's argument and Point I in 
particular, reference is made to the fact that Murray 
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City has adopted a Building Code that stated that banis-
ters should be of a certain height. The defendant feels 
and argues most vigorously that this fact relieves him 
from any responsibility. In this connection it is inter-
esting to note the theory that he requested be pre-
sented to the jury in Instruction No. 15. That instruc-
tion was as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
You are instructed that the Uniform Building 
Code contains the following requirements with regard 
to guardrails: 
"Guardrails. All unenclosed floor openings, 
and open and glazed sides of landings and stairs 
shall be protected by a guardrail or handrail. 
Guardrails shall be not less than thirty-six inches 
(36") in height. Intermediate members in open 
type railings shall be spaced not more than nine 
inches (9") apart." Uniform Building Code, 64 
Edition, Vol. I, Sec. 3305. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the bannister in the defendant's store at Murray, 
Utah was not less than 36" in height, then I instruct 
you that the construction and maintenance of the ban-
ister would be in compliance with the Uniform Build-
ing Code. 
It can be seen that this instruction is simply a 
statement of fact and did not help the jury in determin-
ing whether or not the particular circumstances the 
defendant was or was not negligent in the maintaining 
of its premises. The trial court refused to give the in-
structicin. The instruction, to be proper, should have 
stated, in conformity with well-recognized law, that 
compliance with the Building Code is some evidence 
of whether or not there was a breach of duty. As men-
tioned earlier, the defendant did not articulate this view 
and now seems to insist that the mere fact of compli-
ance with a Building Code as to the height of a banister 
(not taking into consideration the fact that the mop-
board was climbable) relieves it from any and all obli-
gation. This argument, it is respectfully suggested, is 
patently erroneous. 
The plaintiffs' theory of negligence was set forth 
in Instructions No. 17 and 18. The trial court gave forth 
the following instructions and the same, we think, set 
forth the proper law that th ejury should consider under 
the circumstances of this case. This was the theory of 
the plaintiffs. 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
"You are instructed that business establish-
ments catering to the general public owe a duty 
to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition and in such a manner as not to involve 
an unreasonable risk of harm to persons who 
might be reasonably anticipated to be in and 
about said business establishments. 
"In this connection you are instructed that if 
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the manner in which the defendant maintained 
the bannister bordering the stairway leading 
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from the Main Floor to the Basement constituted 
a condition that was not reasonably safe and that 
in allowing said condition to exist def 
failed to exercise the degree of care above de-
scribed, then, and in that event, defendant was 
negligent, and if you further find that such negli-
gence, if any, was a proximate cause of injuries 
to the minor children, then you should find the 
issues in favor of plaintiff and against defendant 
and assess damages in accordance with these in-
structions." 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
"You are instructed that business establish-
ments catering to the general public owe a duty 
to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition and in such a manner as not to involve 
an unreasonable risk of harm to persons who 
might be reasonably anticipated to be in and 
about said business establishments. 
"In this connection you are instructed that if 
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant maintained a banister bordering the 
stairway leading from the Main Floor to the 
Basement at a height that a child of tender years 
might climb and the defendant could, with rea-
sonable practicality, have placed upon the top 
of the banister an addition which would have 
prevented chiddren who may have climbed on 
the banister from falling over and down to the 
floor below, and if you further find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the failure to 
so construct the said addition constituted a failure 
to exercise the degree of care above described, 
then, and in that event, defendant was negligent, 
and if you further find that such negligence, if 
IO 
any, was a proximate cause of the injuries to the 
minor child, then you should find the issues in 
favor of plaintiffs and against defendant and 
assess damages in accordance with these instruer 
tions." 
There is in the defendant's brief no objection to 
this theory nor any exception to these instructions. The 
instructions were defining the standard of care to a busi-
ness invitee of the defendant in this case, that is, that it 
has a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition. The duty, certainly in these instances, is 
much more broad than that which is claimed by the 
defendant in smugly stating that the banister met cer-
tain height requirements of a Building Code. A case 
that sets forth the plaintiffs' theory in this case is 
Thacker v. J.C. Penney Company (5th CCA) 254 F. 
2d 672, in which a two year, two month old child fell 
over a 36 inch high railing along the second floor of 
the store. It was admitted, as in this case, that it was 
reasonable to foresee that children would be in and 
about said railing. The trial court granted a motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds there was no breach 
of duty and no negligence shown. In reversing the 
trial court stated stated the following: 
"What is the scope of the duty here? A store-
owner is not an insurer of an invitee's safety, 
but he is under the affirmative duty of exercising 
due care under all circumstances. The Restate-
ment speaks of the liability of a landowner to 
business visitors 'to exercise reasonable care to 
make the land safe for [their] reception'. Re-
ll 
statement, Torts, Section 343. Harper and James 
state: 'The occupier must use due care not to 
injure the plaintiff by negligent activity and alsu 
to warn him of latent perils actually known to 
the occupier. In addition, the occupier owes the 
duty to inspect his premises and to discover 
dangerous conditions * * * [as] part of a larger 
duty of reasonable caret to make the premises 
reasonably safe.' 2 Harper and James, Law of 
Torts, Section 27.12, p. 1487. 
"A storeowner is under a duty to use due care 
to make the safe for all invitees-for 
a young child as well as for an adult. He owes 
the same degree of care to both, but, of course, 
different precautions must be taken for children, 
if the storeowner' s conduct is to measure up to 
the standard of due care under all the circum-
stances. 'The proprietor of a store or shop who 
invites or induces children to come upon the 
premises must use care to keep the premises 
reasonably safe for children. Account is taken, 
in determining the precautions necessary to be 
exercised, of childish impulses as well as the 
fact that certain dangerous conditions in the store 
or shop may attract small children to their in-
jury.' 38 American Jurisprudence 799, N egli-
gence, Section 177. Age and the ability of a child 
to realize danger, the peculiar attraction certain 
installations have for children, childish impulses, 
the knowledge that young children frequently 
in the past had been attracted to an installation 
are all circumstances to be taken into account 
in determining whether a storeowner has com-
plied with his duty of care to an invitee who is 
a child. If J. C. Penney, through its employees, 
had knowledge that children frequently played 
on the balcony and were attracted to climbing 
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the balcony railing, and if there was a foreseeable 
probability of injury by children climbing the 
railing and failing, defendant was under a duty 
to avoid the danger by taking precautions to 
make the premises reasonably safe. Further, even 
without the actual knowledge of the peril to 
children generally or to Jada particularly, de-
fendant was 'under an affirmative duty to pro-
tect invitees against [dangers] which with rea-
sonable care * * * might (be] discover(edJ'. 
Prosser, Law of Torts, Sec. 78, p. 453. If there-
fore the construction of the railing was such 
that a reasonable person might expect young 
children on the balcony to be attracted to climb-
ing the railing, defendant was under the duty 
to use due care to discover this danger and to 
protect its invitees against the peril. 
"Whether J. C. Penney Company breached 
its duty to use due care to make its store rea-
sonably safe for young invitees is the basic issue 
in this case. We believe that there was a suffi-
cient showing of a breach of duty for the issue 
to be decided by a jury." 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the facts in the 
above quoted case are similar to this case. In the case 
at bar the record was clear defendant knew that chil-
dren of the tender age of plaintiff would be in its store 
and near the banister. In spite of this knowledge de-
fendant permitted the banister to remain unguarded 
and with a climbable mopboard that permitted children 
to do what was done in this case. Again it is repeated 
that the evidence clearly shows defendant completely 
failed to take any precautionary measure to protect 
small children that were in the store. 
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As mentioned at the onset in this case, the assump-
tion defendant makes that compliance with a buildiag 
code, ipso facto, relieves it of any further liability, is 
contrary to the law. 
In Wigmore on Evience, Vol. 2, Sec. 461, at page 
489, the author compares the effect of a statute or 
ordinance with evidence of custom and habit and states 
as follows: 
"This conduct of others, then, ( 1) is receiv-
able as some evidence of the nature of the thing 
in question, because it indicates what is the in-
fluence of the thing on the ordinary person in 
that situation; but ( 2) it is not to be taken as 
fixing a legal standard for the conduct required 
by law. 
* * * * 
"The proper method is to receive it, with an 
express caution that it is merely evidential and 
is not to serve as a legal standard." 
The author then cites the case of Texas and P R 
Compwny v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 23 S.Ct.Rpr. 622, 
wherein Justice Holmes stated: 
"What usually is done may be evidence of 
what ought to be done, but what ought to be 
done is fixed by a standard of reasonable pru-
dence whether it usually is complied with or not." 
It is clear from the foregoing authority the com-
pliance with the Code does not excuse this defendant 
from liability. 
It is respectfully submitted that certainly there 
were sufficient facts for the jury to consider whether 
14 
or nut the defendant was guilty of negligence in this 
particular instance. The only uncontroverted and un-
impeached evidence that the defendant relies upon is the 
conclusion of the Building Code which is not an in-
sulation from liability to a storeowner. The question 
is whether or not the jury was unreasonable in finding 
negligence when defendant invited children to be in 
the store and permitted a banister to be in the area where 
the children would be which was climbable. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ALLOW 
INTO EVIDENCE IN ANY MANNER THE 
FACT THAT DEFENDANT MADE REPAIRS 
TO THE BANISTER SUBSEQUENT TO THE 
ACCIDENT. 
The defendant has cited persuasive authority that 
once an accident has occurred evidence of subsequent 
repairs is not admissible to show that there was negli-
gence at the earlier period of time. The plaintiff does 
not disagree with this rule. There was no evidence that 
was introduced which in any manner showed the fact 
that the defendant subsequent to the accident increased 
the height of the bannister by 17 inches. 'Vhat did 
occur is that the following questions were asked to 
defendant's store manager: 
"Q. Now, with respect to this particular ban-
nister, Mr. Barlocker, it would have been prac-
15 
tical and would have been possible would it not, 
sir, to put a little extension along the top of this 
railing here to raise it a little higher, to m'lke 
it higher, you could do that couldn't you? 
"A. I'm sure it could be done. I man no con-
tractor but I'm sure it could be done. 
"Q. Well, as a practical matter it could have 
been done, couldn't it, just put some sort of ex-
tension on, like this, so that it would make this 
higher and rather than being thirty-six inches 
from the floor, could have been higher, couldn't 
it? 
"A. Yes." 
It appears that what counsel is arguing is that he 
was caught on the horns of a dilemma by the discussion 
of counsel outside of the presence of the jury. It was 
the counsel for plaintiffs' position that if the store 
manager claimed it was not practical to make an exten-
sion, then at that point he would ask that the same 
had been done. It should be noted, however, that stage 
of the proceeding has never reached this point because 
the store manager answered it was practical to extend 
the height of the railing. What counsel seems to be 
arguing is that if plaintiffs' counsel had not forewarned 
him of what his next question might be then perhaps 
the store manager may have answered the question in 
a different manner. Of course, we assume that the 
store manager answered truthfully and to the best of 
his ability. In this case the store manager testified 
that he was present for some years prior to the ac-
cident and that it was his duty to observe danger-
16 
ous conditions in the store. The que.stions presented 
were rroper. To argue what may have happened if the 
manager would have answered differently is quite 
remote. Again, it is repeated there is no place in the 
record where evidence was introduced or attempted to 
be introduced that showed, in fact, Penneys had ex-
tended the height of its banister. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
SUSTAINING PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS 
TO DEFENDANT'S PR 0 FE RR E D EVI-
DENCE. 
Defendant argues the trial court committed preju-
dical error by sustaining an objection to a proposed 
question. Before this ruling may be subject to review by 
this Court the record must indicate the answer which 
the witness would have given to the question. This rule 
is set forth in 4 Am. Jr. 2d, Appeal and Error, Sec. 
520, page 956, wherein it is stated: 
"It appears to be the decided weight of author-
ity that where an objection to a question pro-
pounded to a witness is sustained, the ruling will 
not be reviewed unless the record shows what his 
answer would have been, or at least what the 
questioner expected or proposed to prove by the 
witness, since otherwise the record does not af-
firmatively show that the answers would have 
been competent and material or that the appel-
lant was prejudiced by the ruling." 
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In Re Young's Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731, set 
forth the general rule to be as follows: 
"It is argued, however, that the protestants, in 
this connection, made certain offers of proof re-
specting the contents of the prior will, and that 
it was made to appear what the changes were, 
and hence the proof offered was immaterial. 
". . . Nor are we inclined to depart from the 
general rule that unless it appears from the offer 
the evidence is material the ruling of the court 
will be upheld. The reason upon which the rule 
rests is that the party offering the testimony 
must know what it is, and if, upon his statement, 
it is not material, no error can be committed by 
its exclusion ... " 
This rule is also supported by other cases. John C. 
Blackard et al. v. Monarch's Manufacturers and Dis-
tributors, Inc., 169 N.E. 2d 735, 97 A.L.R. 2d 1255, 
explained. 
"Appellants, in urging that the trial court erred 
in sustaining objections to various questions pro-
pounded by them, have failed to show how these 
rulings could have prejudiced their case. Ex-
cluded testimony is not available on appeal un-
less the court was advised of the specific testi-
mony sought to be elicited. In order to preserve 
for review the refusal of the court to permit a 
witness to answer a question on direct examin-
ation, the motion for new trial must show the 
question, the objection, and the offer to prove 
what evidence would have been given by the 
witness in answer to the question." 
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And in State of New Mexico vs. Hyman Roy, 60 
P.2d 646, llO A.L.R. 1, it is stated: 
"As to the sixth assignment of error, predicated 
upon the refusal of the trial court to permit cer-
tain witnesses to answer questions propounded to 
them in an attempt to show that the defendant 
was of a peculiar nature, we are compelled to rule 
against the defendant. We cannot tell from the 
record whether the defendant was prejudiced. 
The record is silent as to what the evidence 
would have been if not excluded by the court on 
objection of the prosecution. The defendant fail-
ed to make a tender of the testimony which he 
expected to elicit from the witnesses. 
In the case at bar the question sustained by the trial 
court was as fallows: 
"Q. During the time that you have worked 
at the store, did work at the store, from 1961 up 
until the time of this accident, to your knowledge 
had there been any children or other people that 
had fallen over the stairs? 
MR. DIBBLEE: I object to that, your 
Honor, as being immaterial. 
MR. NEBEKER: I think it is material. I 
think it goes to the question of notice and under 
Walgreen, the case of Erickson vs. Walgreen, 
we're entitled to show this is a safe area. At Wal-
green's they did let them show how many people 
went through the doorway without any falls or 
any accidents." 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the record, in 
light of the above authorities, simply does not support 
the defendant's claim of error. 
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Furthermore, the reasons set forth on page 12 of 
the defendant's brief do not support his claim that "de-
fendant should have been allowed to introduce evidence 
of the absence of prior accidents for two critical, inde-
pendent reasons". He asserts that these two reasons are 
as follows: 
1. "* * * such testimony would be evidence that 
the banister was not a dangerous fixture in defendant's 
store." 
2. "* * * the testimony, if allowed, would have 
shown that the defendant had no notice of the allegedly 
dangerous condition." 
As to his first contention, the Court in Erickson v. 
JfT algreen Drug Co. 120 Utah 31, 232 P.2d 210, held 
that: 
"Evidence of the absence of accidents occurring 
prior to the accident complained of may not be 
admissible to establish that an unsafe condition 
did not exist at the time of the accident in ques-
tion." 
His second contention is equally as untenable. In 
Owen v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., Cal. 187 P.2d 785, 
the Court held: 
"On examination of one of defendant's witnesses 
counsel for defendant asked the witness if he had 
ever heard of a similar accident. Objection to 
this question was sustained. Exception is now 
made to the ruling, arguing that by the admission 
of such evidence it would show that defendant 
had not expected any similar accident and would 
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have no reason to believe that any harm would 
come from the loading of the barrels in the man-
ner in which they were loaded, citing Hyland v. 
Seaver, supra. The ruling was not error. While a 
plaintiff may prove previous accidents, for cer-
tain limited purposes, a defendant may not, at 
least in the first instance, prove absence of prev-
ious accidents. (Thompson v. B. F. Goodrich 
Co., 48 Cal. App.2d 723, 729, 120 P.2d 693.) 
See also Hawke v. Barnes, et al, 294, P.2d 1008, 
which stated: 
"It is next argued that the court erred in refus-
ing to allow defendant to testify that no person 
had previously fallen in this area. Plaintiff pro-
duced no evidence to the contrary. It was held 
that for certain limited purposes the plaintiff 
may prove previous accident.s but a defendant at 
least in the first instance, may not prove absence 
of previous accidents." 
In the case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 
supra, the court discussed the circumstances which 
makes such evidence admissible by stating: 
"But such evidence is clearly admissible to prove 
that a possessor of land had no knowledge nor 
could he be charged _with knowledge that an un-
safe condition existed, particularly when the un-
safe condition complained of is latent. In the 
instant case the appellant can only be liable if 
the terrazzo floor when wet subjected business 
visitors to an unreasonable risk and the appellant 
either knew or by the exercise of reasonable care 
could have discovered that such a condition ex-
isted. Evidence that thousands of business vis-
itors had walked through the entranceway in all 
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kinds of weather and that none of them had ever 
complained to the appellant of slipping on the 
terrazzo slab, while not conclusive on the q11i>s-
tion, as heretofore pointed out, does have proba-
tive value upon the question whether the appel-
lant knew or should have known of the existence 
of an unreasonable risk to customers entering and 
leaving the store." 
It is clear that the foregoing ruling applies to cases 
where the charged unsafe condition is latent and hid-
den. The alleged unsafe condition in the Erickson case 
was transient in nature and became unsafe by the appli-
cation of some outside element, that is, rain on the terr-
azzo. Certainly, in this type of case, evidence of the ab-
sence of anyone slipping could have had probative 
value. In the case at Bar, however, the charged unsafe 
condition concerns the construction aspect of the banis-
ter and is a strictly patent and obvious condition. It 
was not incumbent upon plaintiffs to prove that def end-
ant knew small children would be in the store. Nor were 
they required to prove that the banister was only 36 
inches high, contained a 71;2 inch climbable mopboard 
around its base, or that it had no extension to increase 
its height. These facts were all known to the defendant 
because it constructed and maintained in the store the 
banister. These conditions, considered as a whole, were 
obvious defects which rendered this banister unsafe in 
an area where children were expected to frequent. 
In view of the foregoing, proof of the absence of 
any prior accidents is immaterial and gives the defend-
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ant no additional notice as to the condition of this banis-
ter. Thus, the allegation that "such testimony was criti-
cal to the defendant's case, and under Utah law should 
clearly have been admitted" stands totally unsupported 
under the circumstances. 
Another factor which makes this question objec-
tionable is that it was limited in its application. The re-
quested information only concerned the three year per-
iod during which the witness had worked for the store. 
It did not encompass the time from the original con-
struction of the store and banister to the date of the 
accident. The question was also limited to the know-
ledge of the witness and did not include the full and 
complete records of the defendant company. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit the evidence clearly 
presented an issue of fact as to the unsafe condition of 
the banister which the small boy fell over. The record 
shows the trial court properly instructed the jury as to 
the law applicable to the facts of the case and after due 
deliberation the jury found defendant failed to dis-
charge its duty toward plaintiffs and awarded judgment 
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to plaintiffs. The evidence clearly supports the finding 
of the jury, and in the interest of justice, this Court 
should sustain the verdict rendered by the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
ROBERT D. MOORE of 
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
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